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We present a generalization of the temporal propositional logic of
linear time which is useful for stating and proving properties of the
generic execution sequence of a parallel program or a non-deterministic
program. The formal system we present is exactly that same as the third
of three logics presented by Lehmann and Shelah (Information and
Control 53, 165198 (1982)), but we give it a different semantics.
The models are tree models of arbitrary size similar to those used in
branching time temporal logic. The formulation we use allows us to
state properties of the ``co-meagre'' family of paths, where the term
``co-meagre'' refers to a set whose complement is of the first category
in Baire's classification looking at the set of paths in the model as a
metric space. Our system is decidable, sound, and, complete for models
of arbitrary size, but it has the finite model property; namely, every sen-
tence having a model has a finite model. ] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is an extensive literature dealing with correctness
and termination arguments for non-deterministic or distri-
buted processes in which the required condition cannot be
guaranteed to hold for all possible executions. Rather, one
can only guarantee correctness for a ``general,'' ``generic,'' or
``not-exceptional'' execution. For example, in the study of
many probabilistic algorithms (e.g., [CLP83, LR81]), one
is only able to show that the desirable behavior holds with
high probability (i.e., 1).
There is a vast literature on ``fairness'' conditions (e.g.,
[LPS81, Pnu83, Fra86] where one restricts one's attention
to only ``fair'' executions, with different possible definitions
of fairness. Note that in the motivation for this study there
is an implicit assumption that the ``fair'' execution sequences
are most of the execution sequences, that the ``general''
sequence is fair (otherwise it seems necessary to make the
algorithm explicitly care about fairness, but then every
execution is fair, and then the study of fairness assumptions
seems meaningless).
There are many inequivalent definitions of fairness (see
[Fra86]) and there are examples of algorithms which are
correct for one notion of fairness but not correct for a
weaker notion (see for example [LPS81]). The common
theme running through all the definitions of fair executions
is the requirement that the algorithm will be correct in the
general case. This common theme is the one investigated in
this paper.
Lehmann and Shelah [LS82] introduced a generaliza-
tion of the temporal propositional logic, which can be
used for stating and proving properties of probabilistic
programs, when the properties proved are true for most
executions (in the probabilistic sense). Their models are
stochastic systems, with state transition probabilities. They
have presented three different decidable axiomatic systems,
and showed that they are sound and complete for generally
models, finite models, and models with bounded transition
probabilities, respectively. Their language includes, in addi-
tion to the connectives usually used in temporal logic, a new
connective denoted by { and called ``certainly.'' If a is a for-
mula, the formula {a is true iff a is true with probability 1.
In reading [LS82] one is struck by the fact that there is
a vast freedom in choosing the probability distribution in
the model constructed in its completeness proof. Namely,
``most'' executions will have the required properties with
almost any reasonable probability distribution. So it seems
that there is an underlying notion of a general set of execu-
tions which is more basic then having probability 1 with
respect to a particular distribution.
These are the considerations that led to this work. In this
paper we try to formalize the notion of ``general execution.''
We feel that an adequate formalization calls for considering
the topology of the space of possible execution sequences,
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and that the notion of ``meagre set'' well known to
topologists is an adequate formalization of ``exceptional,''
``non-general,'' etc.
Therefore, we reinterpret the extension of temporal logic
suggested by [LS82] by interpreting the connective { as
``for a co-meagre set of paths,'' which intuitively means
``generally it is true that....'' Supporting evidence for this
formalism is the fact that for any reasonable notion of
``general,'' ``generic,'' ``fair'' introduced in the literature (see
for example [Fra86]), the corresponding set of execution
sequences turns out to be a co-meagre set in the appropriate
topology.
It turns out that the system introduced by [LS82] for
finite probabilistic models is sound and complete for this
topological interpretation, even when one considers models
of arbitrary size. Another very pleasing property of our
suggested formalization of the notion of ``general execution''
is the fact that follows from Theorem 8.2 that if we consider
a general execution sequence, namely one that avoids any
set of first category that can be described in our language,
then every property which is definable in our language has
a finite character; namely, if a general sequence has that
property, then there is a finite initial segment of it such that
every general sequence extending this initial segment has the
property.
In [LPS81] a proof system is presented for proving
termination of fair executions for different definitions of fair-
ness. In that system each proof assumes some underlying
well founded relation, for which one can prove that under
certain circumstances we get a value which is smaller under
this relation. Supplying such a relation may be difficult in
practice.
Our approach works only for programs such that their
behavior could be expressed using propositional logic. This
includes many programs such as operating systems where
the number of values that can be written in each register is
bounded, etc., but of course this is not the most general case.
In [AS85] the authors considered different properties of
execution sequences in a topological context. They showed
that what they called ``liveliness'' properties are dense in
the space of possible executions. We feel that the fact that a
certain set of execution sequences is dense is not a sufficient
argument that a general execution will belong to this set (for
example, the set can be a dense countable set). Dense sets
can be made of rather specific and nontypical execution
sequences, and therefore the behavior on a small dense set
does not gives the behavior on ``most'' or ``general'' execu-
tion. For instance, the set of non-fair executions can also
be dense. One needs further arguments; for example, if the
set is of ``finite character'' (namely, having the required
property is determined at a finite stage), only then is being
dense the same as being co-meagre.
The completeness proof is in principle like the proof of
[LS82l for finite models, and we would have liked simply to
refer the reader as much as possible to this proof. However,
the proof for the systems TCB and TCF contains a subtle
mistake, and in order to avoid this mistake we must reverse
the proof, redefining one of the key concepts. The proof we
give suggests how to fix that completeness proof. The mis-
take and a counterexample to one of the key lemmas of
[LS82] appear in the Appendix. We still use as much as
possible the proof of [LS82]. For readers' convenience we
repeat all the needed definitions and quote the lemmas
which we can adopt verbatim.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next
section we give basic definitions and lemmas from set
topology to establish a terminology that we will use later. In
Section 3 we define the model of the logical system, and
show how the notion of fair executions translates to the con-
cept of a co-meagre set. Then we present the language, the
semantics, the definitions of satisfiability and validity, and
the set of axioms and inference rules in Sections 4 to 7,
respectively. In Section 8 we show that the logical system is
sound, and in Section 9that it is complete. In Section 10
we present two examples of the use of our system to prove
desirable properties (such as termination, mutual exclusion,
and freedom from starvation) of parallel programs, and in
Section 11 we provide concluding remarks.
2. SOME BASIC RESULTS FROM SET TOPOLOGY
This section contains some basic results from set topology
that we will use later. Some of the proofs are given in
[BE87], while the others are obvious or can be found easily
in any introductory book in tology (see for example [Ke55]
or [Dix84]).
We will use (X, d ) or just X to denote a metric space X
with the distance function d, and A, B, C, D... to denote sub-
sets of X. N will denote the set of nonnegative integers, and
a nonnegative integer will be denoted by i, j, k...
2.1. Categories of Sets
We remind the reader that a subset A of (X, d ) is nowhere
dense (notation: nowd(X )) if \BX such that B is open in
the metric space X (notation: open(X )) and B{<, _B$B
such that B${<, B$ is open(X ) and A & B$=<.
Definition 2.1. A subset of X is called ``of first category''
(notation: fc(X)) if it can be represented as a union of
countably many nowhere dense sets.
Note that sets of first category can still be dense, for
example, the set of all rational numbers is dense but is of
first category.
Definition 2.2. A subset of X is called ``of second
category'' (notation: sc(X )) if it is not of first category.
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Note that if A is sc(X ), A is not empty, because the empty
set is fc(X ).
Definition 2.3. A subset of X is called ``co-meagre''
(notation: co-m(X )) if its complement in X is of first
category.
It follows from the definition that if X is a metric space,
X is co-m(X ).
Lemma 2.4. If A is co-m(X ) and B is sc(X ) than A & B
is sc(X).
Lemma 2.5. Let A be an arbitrary size set of first
category sets. If for every member Ai of A there is an open
set Gi such that AiGi , and for every i{j Gi and Gj are
disjoint, then the union over A is of first category.
Lemma 2.6. Let AX. If for every set B such that
B{< and B is open(X ) there is an open set C such that
C{<, CB and A & C is fc(X ), then A is fc(X ).
2.2. The Interior and Closure of a Set
Defintion 2.7. The interior of a set A (notation: Int A)
is the maximal open set B such that BA.
Definition 2.8. The closure of A (notation: A ) is the
minimal closed set B such that AB.
Lemma 2.9. F is nowd(X ) iff Int F =<.
2.3. Almost-Open Sets
Definition 2.10. AX is almost-open1 (notation:
almost-open(X )) if there exist a subset B of X such that B is
open(X ) and AqB is fc(X ).2
An almost open set is known in the literature as ``a set
which has Baire's property''.
Lemma 2.11. F is almost-open(X ) iff its complement is
almost-open(X ).
Lemma 2.12. If A is open(X ) and B is almost-open(A),
then B is also almost-open(X ).
Lemma 2.13. A union over a countable set of almost-open
sets is almost-open. The intersection of finitely many almost
open sets is almost open.
Lemma 2.14. Let H be an arbitrary size set of almost
open sets. So for every Hi # H there are sets Gi , Ai , Bi such
that Gi is open(X ), Bi and Ai are fc(X ), and Hi=
(Gi _ Ai )&Bi . If for every Hi # H there is an open set Ei such
that AiEi , and an open set Fi such that BiFi and for each
i{j Ei & Ej=< and Fi & Fj=<, then H i # H Hi is almost-
open(X ).
2.4. A Complete Metric Space
Definition 2.15. A metric space X is complete if every
Cauchy sequence [ pi | i=1, 2, ...] of points converges.
Theorem 2.16. (Baire's Theorem). Let X be a complete
metric space, and let AX. If A is fc(X ) then Int A=<.
Corollary 2.17. If X is a complete metric space, then X
is sc(X ).
Lemma 2.18. Let X be a complete metric space, and let
AX. If A is co-m(X) then A is sc(X ).
2.5. Homeomorphism between Metric Spaces
Definition 2.19. A function f from a metric space X
onto a metric space Y is continuous iff for every G which is
open(Y ), f &1(G) is open(X ).
Definition 2.20. A continuous function f from a metric
space X onto a metric space Y is called a homeomorphism iff
f is one-to-one and f &1 is a continuous mapping from Y
onto X. If there is a homeomorphism from X onto Y we call
X and Y homeomorphic.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. The Model and Its Topological Features
We suppose that a set Pvar of propositional variables is
given. 2Pvar will denote the set of all subsets of Pvar.
Definition 3.1. A model M is a quadruple (S, u, l, R)
where the following holds:
v S is an arbitrary nonenmpty set. Elements of S are
called states and denoted by s, t, u...
v u # S is called the initial state.
v l : S  2Pvar is a labeling function associating to every
state the set of propositional variables that hold in that
state.
v RS_S a serial relation; i.e., for each s # S, there
exists a state t such that R(s, t).
Note that a state s in a model may have more than one
R-successor.
Definition 3.2. A path in a model M is an infinite
sequence of states s0 , s1 , s2 , ....
Paths will be denoted by \, _, {... We shall denote the n th
state of a path _ by _(n), and we shall use _+n to denote the
path defined by _+n(m)=_(n+m).
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2 AqB is the symmetric difference between A and B, that is, AqB=
A _ B&A & B.
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A path _ is legal iff \i # N, R(_(i), _(i+1)). From now
on when we use the term ``path'' we mean a legal path.
For a given state s, we will denote by Ps the set [_ | _ is
a legal path, _(0)=s]. Note that for every s # S Ps{<
because R is serial.
For the logic we consider, every model corresponds to a
tree model which satisfies the same set of formulas. Hence
we will view the model as an infinite tree, where each node
in the tree is labeled by a state, where a state is actually a
subset of Pvar which hold in this state, the root is the initial
state u, and the children of each node s are all and only the
members of the set [t | t # S, R(s, t)]. So a path in a model
is actually a path in the tree which represents the model.
Definition 3.3. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model, and
let s # S. We shall move Ps into a metric space by defining
the distance d between any 2 paths _1 , _2 # Ps , denoted by
d(_1 , _2), as follows: if _1=_2 then d(_1 , _2)=0; else
d(_1 , _2)=1n, where n # N satisfies the following condi-
tions: _1(n){_2(n) and \m # N, m<n O _1(m)=_2(m).
Note that always n{0 (because we define the distance
only between paths that start with the same state), and that
the distance between two paths is always between 0 and 1.
The idea of viewing a set of executions of a concurrent
program as a metric space appears already in [AN80,
BZ82], in the context of semantics of concurrent programs.
Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model. It can be easily shown
that for every s # S, (Ps , d ) is a complete metric space.
Definition 3.4. Let s # S, n # N. The n-environment of
a path _ # Ps (notation: n-env(_)) is defined as follows: if
n>0, then n-env(_)=[_$ | _$ # Ps , d(_, _$)<1n]. if n=0,
then n-env(_)=Ps .
The set n-env(_) is the set of paths that coincide with _ in
the first n+1 states.
Lemma 3.5. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model. Let s # S,
{ # Ps , n # N. The sets n-env({) and P{(n) are homeomorphic.
Definition 3.6. The homeomorphism described in
Lemma 3.5 will be called the natural homeomorohism.
Lemma 3.7. Let (S, u, l, R) be a model. Let s # S,
{ # Ps , n # N. If a set G is open(P{(n)) then the set
[_ | _ # Ps , _+n # G, _ # n-env({)] is open(Ps).
3.2. Fairness in the Model
In this section we will show that for some known defini-
tions given in the literature for fairness, the set of unfair
executions is of first category.
First, we must explain how a concurrent program can be
represented in the model. Each state of the model represents
a state of the programthe values of all the program
variables, the values of the program counters of all its
processes, etc. The initial state represents the initial state of
the program. For states s, t we will have R(s, t) if there is a
process that can transfer the program from a state s to a
state t in one atomic action. So each path in the model
represents a possible execution sequence of the program and
therefore we will often refer to a path as an execution
sequence. A terminating state will be a state where the
program can longer move to a different state.
Since each path in the model is infinite, a finite execution
sequence will be a path in which only the terminating state
appears from some point on, i.e., a path _ denotes a finite
execution if _n # N such that v is a terminating state and
\mn _(m)=v. If a path _ denotes a finite execution we
will call it a converging path.
Let F be the set of all the processes of the program. Our
model is not restricted to a countable set of processes,
because S can be of any cardinality, but in this discussion we
will assume that F is a countable set.
For a path _ and a process f, we will say that f appears in
_ in step n if _(n)=s, _(n+1)=t, and the process f can be
activated at state s of the program and move it to state t.
A process f appears k times in _ if there is A/N such that
|A|=k and \i # A f appears in _ in step i. A process f is
enabled in _ in step n if _t such that the process f can transfer
the program from the state _(n) to the state t.
Each state in our model can be regarded as a model for
propositional logic in an obvious way. A formula in
propositional logic will be called a property, and will be
denoted by , or . We will say that a property , occurs in
_ if there is a state along _ that satisfies ,, , i.e., if _n # N
such that _(n) satisfies ,.
Lehmann et al. [LPS81] consider three types of fairness:
Impartiality, Justice, and Fairness.
v Impartiality. A path is defined to be impartial if it is
either converging or such that \ f # F, f appears infinitely
many times in the path.
Of course here we assume that if the program is not finite,
every process is enabled an infinite number of times in any
execution sequence.
v Justice. A path is defined to be just if it is converging
or if every r process which is continuously enabled beyond
a certain point appears in the path infinitely many times.
v Fairness. A path is said to be fair if it is converging or
if every process that is enabled an infinitely many times
appears in the path infinitely many times.
Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model. We will show that the set
of unfair executions is of first category. Since injustice or not
impartial executions are only a special case of unfair execu-
tions we will get as a consequence that the set of impartial
executions and the set of unjust executions are also of first
category.
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Lemma 3.8. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model which
represents a program. The set of unfair executions of the
program is fc(Pu).
Proof. For every f # F we will show that the set
Af=def [_ | _ # Pu , f is enabled an infinite number of times
in _ but appears only a finite number of times in _] is fc(Pu).
Let f # F, n # N. Let Bf, n=def [_ | _ is not converging, f is
enabled an infinite number of times in _, f appears in _
exactly n times]. Clearly, n # N Bf, n=Af . We will show
that Bf, n is nowhere dense.
Let G be open(Pu) and suppose G & Bf, n{<. Let
{ # G & Bf, n . Let i be the index such that f does not appear
in { after step i. Since G is open, _k such that the k-environ-
ment of { is in G. Let m=MAX[i, k]. Since f is enabled an
infinite number of times in {, _ j such that j>m and f is
enabled in step {( j ). Since f is enabled in step j of {, _t # S
such that R({( j ), t).
Let _ be the path such that \i 0i j _(i)={(i),
_( j+1)=t. Clearly, E=def [The j+1 environment of _] is
open(Pu), EG. Since for every _ # E & Bf, n f appears in _
at least n+1 times, E & Bf, n=<. K
Francez [Fra86] gives a general notion of fairness. He
defines a fairness condition F as a finite, non-empty set of
pairs of state properties, F=[(,j , j ) | 1 jK], where K
is a natural number. Francez then suggests three types of
generalized fairness, where _ is an execution sequence and F
a fairness condition:
v Unconditional F-fairness. _ is unconditionally F-fair iff
for each j, 1 jK, j occurs infinitely often along _.
v Weak F-fairness. _ is weakly F-fair iff for each j,
1 jK: if ,j occurs continuously along _, then j also
occurs infinitely often along _.
v Strong F-fairness. _ is strongly F-fair iff for each j,
1 jK: if ,j occurs infinitely often along _, so does j .
We call a fairness condition F=[(,j , j ) | 1 jK]
feasible iff whenever ,j holds in a state s there is a set of
processes p1 , ..., pn and a set of states s0 , ..., sn such that
s0=s, for every 1in the process pi can transfer the
program from state si&1 to state si and j holds in sn .
From now on we restrict our attention to feasible fairness
conditions (we believe that these are the interesting cases).
A more general definition of a feasible fairness condition can
be found in [AFK88].
We also assume that in unconditional F-fairness, if the
path is not converging, ,j holds infinitely many times
along _.
We can show that under the above assumptions, the set
of strongly fair paths is co-meagre. The proof is very similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.8 above, and since the other types
of fairness is only a special case of this one, we get that also
according to Francez' definitions (with reasonable assump-
tions), the set of all fair executions is co-meagre.
4. THE LANGUAGE
Our language is the same language as presented by
[LS82]. The formulas are composed from propositional
variables, classical connectives, temporal connectives, and
modal connectives. In the formal definition that follows, the
set of all the formulas, 1, will be defined, together with the
``size'' (*) of a formula. Propositional variables will be
denoted by p, q, ..., formulas by a, b...
Definition 4.1. The set 1 of all the formulas is defined
by the following rules:
1. A propositional variable p # Pvar is a formula and
*( p)=1. A propositional variable denotes a basic proposi-
tion, that does not mention time.
2. If b and c are formulas, then:
v cb is a formula and *(cb)=*b)+1.
v b6 c is a formula and *(b6 c)=*(b)+
*(c)+1.
v mb is a formula and *(mb)=*(b)+1. The
symbol m is read ``next'' and denotes the next instant of
time.
v gb is a formula and *(gb)=*(b)+1. The
symbol g is read ``always'' and denotes all the instants of
time from the present (included) and on.
v b Until c is a formula and *b Until c=*(b)+
*(c)+4 (we need *(b Until c)>*(c(b 6 c)) for the
completeness proof). The symbol Until is read ``until.'' The
formula b Until c denotes the fact that, there is an instant of
time in the future when c is true and until the first such
instant of time, b stays continuously true at all intermediate
instants of time.
v {b is a formula and *({b)=*(b)+1. The symbol
{ is read ``Generally'' and denotes ``for almost all'' the paths
that begin from the present state.
We use the following abbreviations: b 7 c for
c(cb 6cc), true for p 6 cp, false for ctrue, b  c for
cb6 c and b W c for (b  c) 7 (c  b). Other abbrevia-
tions are as follows: hb is read ``sometimes b'' and stands
for cgcb, qb is read ``possibly b'' and stands for c{cb.
The rules of precedence are as usual, and  associates to
the right.
5. THE SEMANTICS
In this section we will show how we assign a truth value
to every formula in every path of the model.
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Definition 5.1. Let M be a model (S, u, l, R) , _ a path
in M, and a # 1 a formula. Then
p | _M=true  p # l(_(0)).
That means that the truth value of a propositional variable
relative to (or in) a path depends only on the first state of
the path. Further,
ca | _M=true  a |
_
M=false
a 6 b | _M=true  a |
_
M=true or b |
_
M=true
ma | _M=true  a |
_+1
M =true
ga | sM=true  \n # N a |
_+n
M =true
a Until b | _M=true  _n # N such that b |
_+n
M =true
and \k<n, a | _+kM =true
{a | _M=true  the set [_$ |_$ # P_(0) , a |
_$
M=true]
is co-m(P_(0)).
Note that the truth of a formula of the type {a at a path
_ in a model M depends only on the state _(0) and the
model M.
6. SATISFACTION AND VALIDITY
Intuitively, our notion of satisfiability says that a model
satisfies a formula a if a holds for almost all the paths begin-
ning at the initial state. The intuition behind the definition
of satisfiability in [LS82] is similar, but in their semantics
``almost all paths'' means a set of paths that have probability
one. Here is our formal definition for satisfiability:
Definition 6.1. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model and
a # 1 a formula. We say that M satisfies a and write M < a
if the set [_ | _ # Pu , a | _M=true] is co-m(Pu).
Lemma 6.2. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model. M < a 
M < {a.
Proof.
O: M < a O [_ | _ # Pu , a | _M=true] is co-m(Pu) O
(\_, _ # Pu O {a | _M=true) O [_ | _ # Pu , {a |
_
M=true]=
Pu is co-m(Pu), O M < {a.
o: M < {a O A=def [_ | _ # Pu , {a | _M=true] is co-m
(Pu) O A is sc(Pu) (see Lemma 2.18) O A is not empty
O __ # Pu , {a | _M=true O [_ | _ # Pu , a |
_
M=true] is co-m
(Pu) O M < a. K
Note that in any model M=(S, u, l, R) it may happen
that both M <3 a and M <3 ca. That will happen when the
set [_ | _ # Pu , a | _M=true] is sc(Pu), and the set
[_ | _ # Pu , a | _M=false] is also sc(Pu).
The following is an example of such a model:
FIG. 1. A model M where M <3 gq and M <3 cgq.
Example 6.3 (See Fig. 1 above). Suppose q # Pvar.
M=(S, u, l, R) will be a model where
S=[s, t, u]
l(u)=l(s)=Pvar, l(t)=Pvar&[q]
R=[(u, s), (u, t), (s, s), t, t)].
Clearly, M <3 gq and M <3 cgq.
Definition 6.4. If a # 1, we say that a is valid if every
model M satisfies a, and we shall denote this fact by < a.
7. THE LOGICAL SYSTEM
The logical system we use is exactly the same system
presented by [LS82] for their finite model, with the same
numbering. It contains schemata for axioms and rules of
inference. An axiom schemata denotes all formulas obtained
from it by consistent substitution of arbitrary formulas for
the formula variables (a, b, c) appearing in it, and consistent
substitution of arbitrary propositional variables for the
variables ( p, q, ...) that stand for propositional variables.
A replacement of a propositional variable by an arbitrary
formula is not allowed. The symbol |& denotes provability
in the system.
The system consists of the following axioms and inference
rules. It is not necessarily the most economical.
v The axioms:
(AO) A suitable axiomatization of the propositional
calculus.
(A1) m(a  b)  ma  mb
(A2) cma W mca
(A3) g(a  b)  ga  gb
(A4) a Until b  hb
(A5) ga  a 7 mga 7 ma
(A6) a Until b W b 6 a 7 m(a Until b)
(A7) g(a  ma)  a  ga
(A8) {(a  b)  {a  {b
(A9) q{a W {a
(A10) {a  a
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(A11) p  {p
(A12) {ma  m{a
(A14) ghqa  ha
v The inference rules:
(R0) (Modus Ponens) If |&a and |&a  b, then |&b.
(R1) (g generalization) If |&a, then |&ga.
(R2) ({ generalization) If |&a, then |&{a.
Axioms (A0)(A7) and inference rule (R0) are the logical
system presented by [GPSS80] for the temporal logic of
linear time, with minor modifications resulting from the fact
that their semantics for the connective Until is slightly
different from ours and is as follows: a Until b | _M=
true  _n # N such that b | _+nM =true and for all 0<k<n,
a | _+kM =true. Note that in axiom (A11) p stands for a
propositional variable and cannot be replaced by an
arbitrary formula.
Axiom (A14) intuitively means that if a is possible
infinitely many times, a will happen.
8. SOUNDNESS
In this section we will prove the soundness of the logical
system given in Section 7. First we shall prove two lemmas
which suggest some topological features of the set of paths
in which a certain formula holds. We will use the following
notations: If a is a formula, M=(S, u, l, R) is a model and
P is a set of paths in the model, P(a) will denote the subset
of paths in P in which a is true, and P+n(a) will denote the
set [_ | _ # P, a | _+nM =true].
Lemma 8.1. Let a be a formula, M=(S, u, l, R) a
model, n # N. If for all s # S Ps(a) is almost-open(Ps) then for
all s # S P+ns (a) is also almost-open(Ps).
Proof. For all { # Ps there is a set G{, n such that G{, n
is open(P{(n)) and P{(n)(a)qG{, n is fc(P{(n)) and therefore
also fc(Ps). By Lemma 2.5, { # Ps (P{(n)(a)qG{, n)=
({ # Ps P{(n)(a))q({ # Ps G{, n) is fc(Ps), so P
+n
s (a) is
almost-open(Ps). K
Theorem 8.2. For every formula a and for every model
M=(S, u, l, R) , Pu(a) is almost-open(Pu).
Proof. Let M=(S, u, l, R) be a model and a a formula.
The proof is by induction on the formula structure.
a=p: if p # l(u), then Pu(a)=Pu ; else Pu(a)=<. In either
case, Pu(a) is almost-open.
Suppose that for the formulas b and c, Pu(b) and Pu(c)
are almost-open(Pu). We will show that the assertion holds
for the following cases:
a=cb
Since we assume Pu(b) is almost-open, by Lemma 2.11
Pu(a)=Pu(cb) is almost-open.
a=mb
Follows from Lemma 8.1.
a=gb
Clearly, Pu(cgb)=n # N P+nu (cb). Following the case
a=cb and Lemma 8.1, for every n # NP+nu (cb) is almost-
open. By Lemma 2.13 Pu(cgb) is almost-open and there-
fore (Lemma 2.11) Pu(gb) is also almost-open.
a={b
If Pu(b) is co-m(Pu), then Pu(a)=Pu ; else Pu(a)=<. In
either case, Pu(a) is almost-open.
a=b 6 c
Pu(a)=Pu(b) _ Pu(c) According to the induction hypo-
thesis and Lemma 2.13, Pu(a) is almost-open.
a=b Until c
Pu(a)=n # N [(n&1i=0 n-env(_)
+i (b)) & n-env(_)+n(c)].
By Lemmas 8.1 and 2.13, Pu(a) is almost-open(Pu). K
The meaning of the last theorem was already pointed out
in the introduction: If we ignore sets of first category then
every property that can be expressed in the language is of
finite character.3
Theorem 8.3. For any a # 1, if |&a then <a.
Proof. We will show that if |&a, then for any model
M=(S, u, l, R) and state s # S, Ps(a) is co-m(Ps).
Soundness of axioms A0A11 is easy. The proof can be
found in [BE87] and is similar to the soundness proof for
these axioms as it appears in [LS82]. The soundness proof
for A12 and A14 follows:
(A12) {ma  m{a
Let s # S, { # Ps . Suppose m{a | {M=false. We will show
that {ma | {M=false. m{a |
{
M=false  {a |
{+1
M =false 
P{(1)(ca) is sc(P{(1)).
In the natural homeomorphism f between 1-env({) and
P{(1) , f &1(P{(1)(ca))=(1-env({))(cma), so (1-env({))
(cma) is sc(1-env({)). Since 1-env({) is open(Ps), (1-env({))
(cma) is sc(Ps). Since (1-env({))(cma) is a subset of
Ps(cma), the later is also sc(Ps). So \_ # Ps{ma | _M=false
and especially {ma | {M=false.
(A14) ghqa  ha
Let s # S. We will show that A=def [_ | _ # Ps ,
ghqa | _M=true, and ha |
_
M=false] is fc(Ps). We will use
Lemma 2.6. Let G be open(Ps). We will show that there
exists an open set G$, G$G, such that G$ & A is fc(Ps).
133TEMPORAL LOGIC
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property.
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If G & A=<, then we will choose G$=G; else there exists
{ # G & A. Since G is open, there exists n # N such that the
n-environment of { is in G.
Since ghqa | {M=true, there exists mn such that
qa | {+mM =true. That means that P{(m)(a) is sc(P{(m)).
According to Theorem 8.2, there exists a set E which is
open(P{(m)) and sets C, D which are fc(P{(m)) such that
P{(m)(a)=(E _ C)&D. Since P{(m)(a) is sc(P{(m)), E is not
empty.
Assertion A. P{(m)(ca) & E is fc(P{(m)).
Proof. Suppose conversely that P{(m)(ca) & E is
sc(P{(m)); so for every set CP{(m)P{(m)(ca) & (E _ C)
is sc(P{(m)), and so for every set D which is
fc(P{(m)), [(E _ C)&D] & P{(m)(ca) is sc(P{(m)) and there-
fore not empty. So we cannot find C and D which
are fc(P{(m)) and P{(m)(a)=(E _ C)&D, a contradic-
tion. K (Assertion A)
The natural homeomorphism f between n-env({) and
P{(m) implies that f &1(P{(m)(ca))=(m-env({)+m)(ca),
(m-env({)+m)(ca) & f &1(E ) is fc(n-env({)) and therefore
fc(Ps), and f &1(E ) is open(n-env({)) and not empty.
Clearly, A & n-env({)(m-env({)+m)(ca), and therefore
A & n-env({) & f &1(E )=A & f &1(E) is fc(Ps). Since
n-env({)G and n-env({) is open(Ps), f &1(E ) is an open
subset of G. We will choose G$=f &1(E ).
Soundness of the inference rules:
(R0) (Modus Ponens)obvious.
(R1) If |&a, then |&ga
Suppose that for every model M, M < a. We want to
show that for every model M, M < ga. Let M=
(S, u, l, R) be an arbitrary model. Clearly, Pu(cga)=
n # N P+nu (ca). We will show that for every n, P
+n
u (ca) is
fc(Pu). Let n # N, { # Pu . In the natural homeomorphism
f between n-env({) and P{(n), f &1(P{(n)(ca))=
n-env({)+n (ca). Since < a P{(n)(ca) is fc(P{(n)) and
therefore n-env({)+n (ca) is fc(n-env({)). Since n-env({) is
open(Pu), n-env({)+n (ca) is fc(Pu).
Let EPu be the maximal set such that for every {,
_ # E _{{ O n-env({) & n-env(_)=<. By Lemma 2.5.
_ # E n-env({)+n (ca) is fc(Pu). Clearly, P +nu (ca)=
_ # E n-env({)+n (ca).
(R2) If |&a, then |&{a
R2 is obviously sound in light of Lemma 6.2. K
9. COMPLETENESS
Our completeness proof is a variation of the completeness
proof presented by [LS82].
The basic idea of the proof goes back to the proof of the
completeness of temporal logic by [GPSS80]. The idea is to
try to use states which are partial theories expressing what
the sequences starting from this state should satisfy. In order
to satisfy a {b formula at a path _ which requires b to be
false, we have to construct many sequences starting from the
first state of _ in which b is true (this motivates the ``alter-
native'' relation).
In the first subsection we repeat results from [LS82].
9.1. Results from Lemann and Shelah's Paper
We will use the following theorem:
(T3) |&ha W a 6 mha
9.1.1. Theories, Traces, and Relations among Them
9.1.1.1. Theories
Definition 9.1. A theory is any subset of 1.
Definition 9.2. A theory T is said to be inconsistent if
there is n # N and formulas a0 , a1 , ..., an # T such
that |&a1 7 . . . 7 an  ca0 . If T is not inconsistent, it is
said to be consistent.
Definition 9.3. A theory T is said to be complete if for
any formula a # 1, either a # T or ca # T.
Lemma 9.4. If T is a consistent and complete theory, then
(a) if a # T and |&a  b, then b # T;
(b) a # T  ca  T;
(c) a 6 b # T  a # T or b # T;
(d) if T $ is a consistent theory (not necessarily complete),
then there is a consistent and complete theory T such that
T $T;
(e) |&% a  there is a consistent and complete theory T
such that ca # T.
9.1.1.2. Relations among Theories
The successor relation
Definition 9.5. Let T1 and T2 be two theories. We say
that T2 is a successor of T1 and write T1 \T2 if \a # 1 such
that ma # T1 , we have a # T2 .
Lemma 9.6. If T is consistent and complete theory, there
is a unique consistent and complete theory T + such that
T\T +. It is characterized by a # T +  ma # T.
The future relation
Definition 9.7. We say that T2 is a future of T1 and
write T1T2 if \a # 1 such that ga # T1 , we have a # T2 .
Lemma 9.8. Among consistent and complete theories
the relation  is reflexive and transitive; it contains the
relation \.
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Lemma 9.9. Let T be a consistent and complete theory
and a # 1 a formula with cga # T. There is a consistent and
complete theory T $, such that TT $ and ca # T $.
The alternative relation
Definition 9.10. We say that T2 is an alternative for T1
and write T1#T2 if \a # 1 such that {a # T1 , we have
a # T2 .
Lemma 9.11. Among consistent and complete theories
the relation # is an equivalence relation.
A consequence is that, if T#T $, then {a # T iff {a # T $.
Lemma 9.12. Let T be a consistent and complete theory
and a # 1 a formula with c{a # T. There is a consistent and
complete theory T $ such that T#T $ and ca # T $.
Whenever R1 and R2 are relations, R1R2 will denote the
composition of the two relations (R1 first, and then R2).
Lemma 9.13. Let k0 and T0 , T1 , ..., Tk be consistent
and complete theories such that \i, 0i<k, Ti#\Ti+1.
There are consistent and complete theories Vi , for i=0, ..., k,
such that
1. Vk=Tk ,
2. Vi#Ti , \i, 0ik,
3. Vi \Vi+1 , \i, 0i<k.
9.1.1.3. Therminal theories and Terminal Relations
Terminal theories
Definition 9.14. A consistent and complete theory T is
said to be terminal iff it satisfies any one of the two equiv-
alent properties:
1. \a, a # 1, hga # T O a # T,
2. \a, a # 1, ha # T O gha # T.
Lemma 9.15. 1. Let T and T $ be consistent and com-
plete theories, such that TT $, then, if T is terminal, so is T $.
2. Let T be a consistent, complete, and terminal theory,
then T +T.
Lemma 9.16. Let T be a consistent and complete theory,
then there is a consistent and complete terminal theory T $,
such that TT $.
Terminal relations
Definition 9.17. Let T1 and T2 be consistent and com-
plete. We say that T2 is a terminal alternative for T1 and
write T1rT2 iff
1. T1#T2 ,
2. T1T2 ,
3. T2T1 .
Conditions (2) and (3) together are equivalent to : \a # 1,
ga # T1  ga # T2 .
Note that by Lemma 9.15, if T1 is terminal and T1rT2 ,
then T2 is also terminal.
Lemma 9.18. Among consistent and complete theories,
the relation r is an equivalence relation: it is contained in the
relation #.
9.1.1.4. Basic Lemmas
Lemma 9.19. Let T be a consistent complete terminal
theory and a # 1 a formula with c{a # T. There is a consis-
tent and complete theory T $, such that TrT $ and ca # T $.
The theory T $ is terminal.
Lemma 9.20. Let k0 and T0 , T1 , ..., Tk be consistent
and complete terminal theories such that \i, 0i<k,
Tir\Ti+1. There are consistent and complete terminal
theories Vi , i=0, ..., k such that
1. Tk=Vk
2. VirTi , \i, 0ik
3. Vi\Vi+1, \i, 0i<k.
9.1.1.5. Traces and Relations among Them
Since not every consistent theory has a model, we need to
restrict our attention to a finite set of formulas. Withour loss
of generality, from now on we will assume that Pvar is finite
set. Therefore, for every n # N, 1n is finite, where we define
1n to be the set of all formulas of size less or equal to n.
We are interested only in the formulas of 1n , but for the
completeness proof we need to consider also some larger
formulas. So we define n$ to be slightly larger than n, for
example, we define n$=def 3n+10. We define traces of
theories over 1n$ , but we'll claim only about formulas of 1n .
Definition 9.21. A trace D of size n is the intersection
of some consistent and complete theory T with 1n$ .
Note that we use here n$ not n. Since in our proof n will
be fixed, we will usually use simply the term ``trace'' instead
of ``trace of size n.'' Let Dn be the set of all traces of size n.
Dn is a finite set.
We define between traces all the relations that have been
defined between theories, \,, #, #\, r\, and r , in the
following way: DRD$  there are theories T and T $ such
that D=T & 1n$ , D$=T $ & 1n$ , and TRT $. Note that #\
and r\ are the projections of the composition of relations,
not the composition of the projections. Similarly, terminal
traces are traces of terminal theories.
We define \* to be the reflexive and transitive closure of
the relation \ on traces. Note that \* is the reflexive and
transitive closure of the projection, not the projection of the
reflexive and transitive closure.
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Lemma 9.22. Let D and D$ be traces. If DD$, then
D\*D$.
9.2. New Results
Some more theorems about traces:
Lemma 9.23. Let D be a trace, and let a # 1 be a formula
such that ha # D. There exists a trace D$ such that D\*D$
and a # D$.
Proof. Suppose cgca # D. By Lemma 9.9, there exists
a trace D$ such that DD$ and a # D$. By Lemma 9.22
D\*D$. K
Lemma 9.24. Let D0 , D1 , ..., Dk be traces such that \i,
0i<k, Di\Di+1 and a # 1 is a formula such that ha # D0
and *(ha)<n$. If \i, 0i<k, a  Di , then ha # Dk .
Proof. By induction on k:
Case k=0. Obvious.
Case k>0. By the induction hypothesis ha # Dk&1. By
(T3), and since a  Dk&1 and *(ha)<n$, mha # Dk&1.
Since Dk&1\Dk , ha # Dk . K
Lemma 9.25. Let m # N, m<n$. Let D0 be a trace.
There exist traces D1 , ..., Dk such that \i, 0i<k Di \Di+1
and \a # 1 such that *(ha)m and ha # D0 _ j<k such
that a # Dj .
Proof. Let m<n$, A=def [a | ha # D0 , *(ha)m].
Since D0 is a finite set of formulas, _n # N such that |A|=n.
So we can arrange all the members of A in an order
a0 , ..., an .
The proof goes by induction on n:
Case n=0. Since ha0 # D0 , by Lemma 9.23 there exist
a trace D$ such that D0\*D$ and a # D$. By Lemma 9.6 there
exists a trace E such that D$\E.
Case n>0. By the induction hypothesis, there exist
j # N and traces D1 , ..., Dj such that \i, 0i< j Di\Di+1
and for every ai , 0in&1 _li < j such that ai # Dli . If
_l< j such that an # Dl , we are done; else by Lemma 9.24,
han # Dj . By Lemma 9.23, there exists a trace D$ such that
Dj \*D$ and an # D$. By Lemma 9.6, there exists a trace E
such that D$\E. K
9.3. The Completeness Proof
Theorem 9.26. For any a # 1, if < a then |&a.
Proof. Suppose that |&% a; we will build a model that
does not satisfy a. By Lemma 9.4(e), there is a consistent
and complete theory Ta , that contains ca. We define
n=*(a) and look at traces of size n. Let Da=def Ta & 1n$ .
Da is a trace of size n that contains ca.
The model M=(S, u, l, R) that does not satisfy a is
defined in the following way:
v S=Dn
v u=Da
v l(D)=[ p | p # D]
v Let D # S. If D is not terminal, then \E # S, R(D, E) iff
D#\E. If D is terminal, then \E # D, R(D, E ) iff Dr\E.
Note that since # and r are reflexive, \E, D # S
E\D O R(E, D), and since (by Lemma 9.6) for each trace D
there is a trace E such that D\E, the model satisfies:
\D # S _E such that R(D, E ).
Note that if D is terminal and R(D, E) then E is also ter-
minal, according to Definition 9.17 and Lemmas 9.8 and
9.15.
If D\E we will call the transition from D to E a
\-transition.
From now on, we will continue using the notation s, t,
u, ... for the states of the model, keeping in mind that each
state is actually a trace of size n.
Definition 9.27. Let m, n # N. Let _ be a path in M.
We shall say that _ is an m, n-standard path if there exist
indices i0<i1 } } } <im such that the following condition
hold:
1. i0=0.
2. _(i1) is terminal.
3. \ j such that 1 j m and \a # 1 such that
*(ha)n and ha # _(ij&1), exist ij&1k<ij such that
a # _(k).
4. \ j, 0 j <im , _( j )\_( j+1)
Our definition of an m-standard path modifies the one given
by [LS82]:
Definition 9.28. Let _ be a path in M. We will say that
_ is m-standard if it is m, m-standard.
Note that:
1. If a path _ is m-standard, then \ii1 (i1 as in Defini-
tion 9.28 above) _(i) is terminal.
2. If a path _ is m-standard, then \i # N _(i)r
\_(i+1).
Lemma 9.29. Let m<n$, and let i0 , i1 , ..., im witness the
fact that _ is m-standard according to Definition 9.28. For
all i, 0ii1 , and \k<m, _+i is k-standard.
Proof. Let 0ii1 . It is enough to show that _+i is
(m&1)-standard. We claim that i, i2 , i3 , ..., im witness the
fact that _+i is (m&1)-standard. Conditions 1, 2, and 4 of
Definition 9.28 clearly hold for these indices. It is left to
prove that condition 3 holds for them. Clearly, \l such
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that 2<lm and \a # 1 such that *(ha)m and
ha # _(il&1), exist il&1k<il such that a # _(k).
Now, suppose *(ha)m&1 and ha # _(i). If i=i1 ,
then since _ is m-standard there must exist il<i2 such
that a # _(l ). If i<i1 and there is no such l which is smaller
than i1 , it must be (Lemma 9.24) that ha # _(i1), and since
_ is m-standard there must be such l.
Definition 9.30. A path _ is said to be ultimately
m-standard if there is n # N such that _+n is m-standard.
Lemma 9.31. Let m # N, m<n$, s # S. For every 0 j m
there exists a path {j # Ps such that {j is j, m-standard.
Proof. Let m # N. The proof goes by induction on j.
Case j=0. Obvious.
Case j=1. We will define {0(0)=s. By Lemma 9.25
there exist traces D1 , ..., Dk such that \n, 1n<k
Dn \Dn+1 , s\D1 , and \a # 1 such that *(ha)m and
ha # s _n<k such that a # Dn . We will define \n, 1nk,
{0(n)=Dn . If Dk is terminal, we will choose i1=k; else, by
Lemma 9.16, _t such that t is terminal and Dkt. By
Lemma 9.22 there exist traces E0 , ..., El such that \i,
0i<l, Ei \Ei+1, E0=Dk , and El=t. We will define \i
0il, {0(k+i)=Ei , and choose i1=k+l.
Case j >1. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a
path {j&1 # Ps such that {j&1 is ( j&1), m-standard. By
Lemma 9.25 there exist traces D1 , ..., Dn such that \i,
1i<n, Di \Di+1 , _(ij&1) \D1 , and \a # 1 such that
*(ha)m and ha # _(ij&1) _i<n such that a # Di . We
will define \i, 0iij&1 , {j (i)={j&1(i); \i, 1in,
{j (ij&1+i)=Di . K
Lemma 9.32. Let s # S, m # N, 1m<n$. If A is the set
of m-standard paths beginning at s, then Int A{<.
Proof. By Lemma 9.31 above _{ such that { is m-standard.
The im-environment of { is open(Ps) and it is a subset
of A. K
Lemma 9.33. Let s # S, m # N, m < n$. The set
[_ | _ # Ps , _ is ultimately m-standard]is co-m(Ps).
Proof. We will show that the set [_ | _ # Ps , _ is not
ultimately m-standard] is nowhere-dense, by proving that
for every set G{< which is open(Ps) there is a set G$ such
that G$G, G${<, G$ is open(Ps), and \_ # G$, _ is
ultimately m-standard.
Let G be open(Ps), and suppose that G{<. Let { # G.
Since G is open, _n such that the n-environment of { is in G.
By Lemma 9.32, there is a set D{< which is open(P{(n))
and for every _ # D _ is m-standard.
Define G$ =def [_ | _ # n-env({), __$ # D _$ = _+n].
Clearly, G$G, G${<, and each _ # G$ is ultimately
m-standard. By Lemma 3.7, G$ is open. K
The definitions of generic path and equivalent paths are
the same as in [LS82]:
Definition 9.34. Let _ and { be paths in M. _ and { are
said to be equivalent (notation: _#{) if \i # N, _(i)#{(i).
Definition 9.35. Let _ be a path in M. _ is said to be
generic if for any trace s0 that appears an infinite number of
times in _ and for any finite sequence of traces s0 , s1 , ..., sm
such that si\si+1 for every i such that 0i<m, the
sequence above appears in _ an infinite number of times.
Note that if a path is generic, and if a trace s appears an
infinite number of times in the path, then every trace t such
that s\*t also appears an infinite number of times in the
path.
The following lemma corresponds to [LS82] claim that
a generic sequence has probability one.
Lemma 9.36. Let s # S. The set [_ | _ # Ps , _ is generic]
is co-m(Ps).
Proof. Let s # S. We will show that the set [_ | _ # Ps , _
is not generic] is fc(Ps).
[_|_ # Ps , _ is not generic]=t # S [m # N [x # B t , m
[n # N At, x, n]]], where Bt, m=def [x | x is a sequence of
m+1 traces s0 , ..., sm such that s0=t and \i, 0i<m,
si\si+1], and At, x, n=def [_ | _ # Ps , t appears in _ an
infinite number of times, but x appears exactly n times in _].
Note that S=Dn is a finite set, so it is enough to show that
for every t # S, m # N, n # N, and x # Bt, m , At, x, n is nowhere
dense.
Let G be open(Ps), and suppose G{< and G & At, x, n
{<. Let { # G & At, x, n . _n1 such that the sequence x does
not appear after {(n1). _n2 such that the n2-environment of
{ is in G. Since t appears an infinite number of times in {,
_k, k>MAX(n1 , n2) such that _(k)=t. Since At, x, n is not
empty, we have traces s0 , ..., sm , which form the sequence x,
such that \i, 0i<m, si \si+1 .
We will define the following path {$ (we define only its
beginning, and as in previous proofs, this is enough):
v \i, 0ik {$(i)={(i),
v \i, 0im {$(k+i)=si .
There is a path {$ that begins in this way. Since {$ is in the
n2-environment of {, {$ # G.
Since G is open, _ j, j >k+m such that C=def [the
j-environment of {$] is in G. C is open, not empty, and in
every path in C the sequence x appears at least n+1 times.
So C & At, x, n=<. K
Lemma 9.37. Let s # S, m # N, m<n$. The set of generic
m-standard paths beginning at s is sc(Ps).
Proof. Let A=def [_ | _ # Ps , _ is generic], B=def
[_ | _ # Ps , _ is m-standard]. We have proved that A is
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co-m(Ps) and B is sc(Ps), so by Lemma 2.4 A & B is
sc(Ps). K
Lemma 9.38. Let b # 1n , _ a *(hb)-standard generic
path of M and { and {$ be two equivalent paths of M; then
(a) b | _M=true  b # _(0)
(b) b | {M=true  b |
{$
M=true.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the size of b
(i.e., *(b)). At each induction step we will prove (a) and
then (b). We define m=*(hb) and throughout the proof
we let i0 , i1 , ..., im witness the fact that _ is m-standard
according to Definition 9.28. The cases b=p, b=cc, and
b=c 6 d are done in a way similar to [LS82]. We will
elaborate on the other cases:
b=mc. (a) Suppose mc # _(0). Since m1, by Defi-
nition 9.27, _(0) \_(1), so c # _(1). Since _ is m-standard
and *(hc)<m, _+1 is *(hc)-standard (Lemma 9.29).
Also, _+1 is generic since _ is, so by the induction
hypothesis c | _+1M =true, so mc |
_
M=true.
Suppose mc  _(0). For the same reasons as before,
c | _+1M =false O mc |
_
M=false.
(b) mc | {M = true  c |
{+1
M = true  (Since { # {$, {
+1
#{$+1, so we can use the induction hypothesis) c | {$+1M =
true  mc | {$M=true.
b=gc. (a) 1. Suppose gc # _(0). We will show that
gc| _M=true.
Claim. \i, gc # _(i).
Proof. This will be shown by induction on i. For i=0,
gc # _(i) by the assumption. Now, suppose gc # _(i). By
Definition 9.28, _(i)r\_(i+1); i.e., there exists a trace E
such that _(i)rE and E\_(i+1), so gc # _(i) O gc # E.
Using (A5), gc  mgc, and since n$n+1, mgc # E.
Since E\_(i+1) we get gc # _(i+1). K
As a corollary to the above claim, \i # N, c # _(i),
because by (A5) gc  c. We will show that \i #
Nc | _+iM =true. Let i # N. We will distinguis between two
cases:
Case _(i) is not terminal. We will show that in this case
the path _+i is generic and *(hc)-standard, and since
c # _+i (0), by the induction hypothesis c | _+iM =true. We
know that _ is a generic m-standard path, and since _(i) is
not terminal, it must be that i<i1 (see Definition 9.28), so
since *(c)<*(gc), _+i is *(hc)-standard. Since _ is
generic, _+i is also generic.
Case _(i) is terminal. In this case we will show a generic
m-standard path { such that {#_+i. We will use the induc-
tion hyposthesis, part (a), to show that c | {M=true, and
then, since {#_+i, it will follow from the induction
hypothesis, part (b), that c | {M=c |
_+i
M =true.
Since S is finite, _s # S such that s appears an infinite
number of times in _. Following Lemmas 9.25 and 9.6
there is a sequence of states s0 , s1 , ..., sk such that s0=s
and for all 0l<k, si\si+1, and there are indices
i0=0, i1 , ..., im # [1, ..., k] for which condition 3 in Defini-
tion 9.28 holds. Since _ is generic _ j>i such that _+(i+j )
begins with this sequence. Clearly, _+(i+j ) is generic and
*(hc)-standard. Since _(i) is terminal, \0k j, _(i+k)
is also terminal. By Lemma 9.20, then, we can find traces Ek
for 0kj such that:
1. Ej=_(i+j )
2. Ekr_(i+k), \k, 0kj
3. Ek\Ek+1 , \k, 0k<j.
Let the path { be defined by
v \k, 0k j, {(k)=Ek .
v \k, k> j, {(k)=_(i+k).
{ is generic and *(hc)-standard. So by the induction
hypothesis c | {M = true  c # {(0). But {(0) = E0 and
E0r_(i). Since gc # _(i), gc # {(0), so also c # {(0), so
c | {M=true. Since {#_+i, by the induction hypothesis part
(b) c | _+iM =true.
2. Suppose gc  _(0). We will show that, gc| _M=
false.
Since gc  _(0) and n$>n+3, gcc # _(0). Since
*(cc)=*(gc) and _ is *(hgc)-standard, _i<i1 such
that cc # _(i) O c  _(i). Since i<i1 and *(c)<*(gc),
_+i is *(hc)-standard. Obviously, _+i is generic, so by the
induction hypothesis, c | _+iM =false O gc |
_
M=false.
(b) gc | {M = true  \i # N, c |
{+i
M = true  (since
{#{$, \i, {+i#{$+i, so we can use the induction hypothesis
part (b)) \i # N c | {$+1M =true  gc |
{$
+=true.
b=c Until d. (a) Suppose c Until d # _(0). Then, by
(A4), hd # _(0). Since *(hd )<*(hc Until d ) and _ is
*(gc Until d)-standard, _k<i1 such that d # _(k). Let i be
the smallest such k.
Claim. \ j, 0 j <i c # _( j ) and m(c Until d ) # _( j ).
Proof. By induction on j:
Case j=0. By (A6), c Until d # _(0) O (n$2n) d6
(c7m(c Until d)) # _(0) O (d  _( j )) c7 m(c Until d)
# _(0).
Case j>0. Since j&1<i1 , _( j&1) \_( j ). By the induc-
tion assumption m(c Until d ) # _( j&1) O c Until d # _( j ),
and we conclude as in the case j=0.
Now, since *(c)<*(c Until d ), *(d )<*(c Until d )
and i<i1 , we can use the induction hypothesis to show that
\j, 0 j <i, c | _+jM =true and d |
_+i
M =true O c Until d |
_
M
= true.
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Suppose c Until d  _(0). Then, by (T7), and since
n$>3n, gcd 6 [cd Until (cc 7 cd )] # _(0). So either
gcd # _(0) and since *(g=cd )<*(c Until d ) we can
use the induction hypothesis to show that gcd | _M=
true O c Until d | _M=false; or cd Until (cc 7 cd ) # _(0),
and by (A4) h(cc 7 cd ) # _(0). Since *(cc 7 cd )
*(c Until d), _k<i1 such that cc 7cd # _(i). Let i be the
smallest such k.
Claim. \j, 0 j <i d  _( j ) and m(c Until d )  _( j ).
Proof. By induction on j.
Case j=0. Suppose d # _(0); then by (A6) c Until
d # _(0), a contradiction. For the same reason, c 7
m(c Until d)  _(0). Since j<i and d  _(0), c # _(0), so we
must conclude that m(c Until d )  _(0).
Case j>0. Since i<i1 , _( j&1) \_( j ). m(c Until d ) 
( j&1) O (n$>n+2) cm(c Until d) # _( j&1) O (by (A2)),
mcc Until d # _( j&1) O cc Until d # _( j ) O c Until d 
_( j ), and we conclude as in the case j=0. K
Now, since *(d )<*(c Until d ), *(cc 7 cd )<
*(c Until d) and i<i1 , we can use the induction hypothesis
to conclude that cc 7cd | _+iM =true and \j , 0 j <i,
cd | _+jM =true. So c Until d |
_
M=false.
(b) c Until d | {M=true  _ j # N such that d |
{+j
M =
true and \i< j c | {$+iM =true  (by the induction hypothesis)
d | {$+jM =true and \i< j c |
{$+i
M =true  c Until d |
{$
M=true.
b={c. (a) Suppose {c # _(0).
Let s=def _(0). We want to show that [_ | _ # Ps ,
c | _M=true] is co-m(Ps). By Lemma 9.33 [_ | _ # Ps , _ is
*(hc)-ultimately standard] is co-m(Ps). By Lemma 9.36
[_ | _ # Ps , _ is generic] is co-m(Ps), so [_ | _ # Ps , _ is
generic and *(hc)-ultimately standard] is co-m(Ps). So it
is enough to show that \_ # Ps such that _ is generic and
*(hc)-ultimately standard, c | _M=true.
So let { # Ps be a generic ultimately *(hc)-standard
path. We will build a generic *(hc)-standard path {$ such
that {#{$. We will get {(0)#{$(0), and since {c # {(0),
{c # {$(0) (see Lemma 9.11). By A10: {c  c, so c # {$(0). If
we use the induction hypothesis part (a), we get c | {$M=true.
By the induction hypothesis part (b), c | {M=c |
{$
M , so we get
c | {M=true.
So now it is left to show {$ as described above. Since {
is *(hc)-ultimately standard, _ j # N such that {+j, is
*(hc)-standard. By Lemma 9.13 there are traces si ,
0i j, such that sj={( j ), si#{(i), and si\si+1 \i,
0i< j. We will define the path {$ by {$(i)=si \i, 0i< j,
{$(i)={(i) \i, ji. Clearly, {$ is *(hc)-standard and {$#{.
{$ is generic because { is generic.
Suppose {c  _(0).
We will show that there is a set Q such that
Q[{ | { # P_(0) , c | _M=false, and Q is sc(P_(0)), and so
{c | _M=false. Whether _(0) is terminal or not, there exists
(by Lemma 9.12 or Lemma 9.19) a trace E such that
_(0)#E, c  E, and if _(0) is terminal, E is terminal and
_(0)rE. By Lemma 9.6, we have E$ such that E\E$ . We
will define the set Q as follows: Q=def [{ | { # P_(o) ,
{(1)=E$, {+1 is generic and *(hc)-standard].
Claim. Q is sc(P_(0)).
Proof. Let A=def [{ | { # PE$ , { is generic and *(hc)-
standard], B=def [{ | { # P_(0) , {(1)=E$]. According to
Lemma 3.5 there is a natural homeomorphism f between B
and PE$ . Clearly, f &1(A)=Q. By Lemma 9.37 A is sc(PE$),
so Q is sc(B). B is open(P_(0)), so Q is sc(P_(0)). K
Claim. \{ # Q c | {M=false.
Proof. Let { # Q. Let {$ be the path defined by {$(0)=E,
\i1, {$(i)={(i). {$ is generic *(hc)-standard path. By
the induction hypothesis, part (a), and since c  E, we have
c | {$M=false. But since {$#{, by the induction hypothesis,
part (b), c | {M=false. K
(b) Let _ be a generic *(hb)-standard path such
that {(0)=_(0) (by Lemma 9.37 there exist such _).
Since the truth value of {c depends only on the first
state of the path, we have {c | {M={c |
_
M . By part (a),
{c | _M=true  {c # _(0)  {c # {(0). With a similar
justification, {c | {$M=true  {c # {$(0). Since {(0)#{$(0),
{c # {(0)  {c # {$(0). K
Lemma 9.39. The model M described above does not
satisfy a.
Proof. By Lemma 9.37, the set A of generic *(ha)-
standard paths beginning at u is of second category. By
Lemma 9.38 \_ # A, a | _M=true W a # u. By the way we have
built M, a  u, so \_ # A a | _M=false. So the set [_ | _ # Pu ,
a | _M=true] is not co-m(Pu), so M does not satisfy a. K
10. EXAMPLES
We will conclude by showing two examples of the use of
the logical system presented in this paper.
10.1. Proving Termination Property
First we will use the system presented in this work to
describe a simple parallel program and prove that it ter-
minates in a co-meagre set of its possible executions. This
program appears in [LPS81] without the proof of its ter-
mination. Consider the following two process program
illustrated in Fig. 2.
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FIGURE 2
The propositional variables we will use are:
atl0 is true iff P1 is in label l0 .
atl1 is true iff P1 is in label l1 .
atm0 is true iff P2 is in label m0 .
posy is true iff y>0.
We want to show that the program may terminate in all
its possible execution sequences, except a set of executions
which is of first category. The program will terminate when
P1 is at label l1 , P2 is at label m0 , and y is equal to 0. So the
claim we want to make about the program may be for-
malized in the following proposition:
(G) atl0 7 atm0  hg(atm0 7 atl1 7 cposy ).
The following propositions will describe the program:
(A) g[(atl0 7atm0)  [m(atl0 7atm0) 6m(atl1 7
atm0)] 7 qm(atl0 7 atm0) 7 qm(atl1 7atm0)]
This proposition expresses the fact that if P1 is at label l0
and P2 is at label m0 , either P1 will be activated and will be
at label l1 or P2 will be activated and will stay at label m0 ,
and both possibilities can actually occur.
(B) g(atl1  gatl1)
This proposition says that once P1 reaches label l1 , it will
always be there.
(C) gatm0
This proposition says that P2 is always at label m0 .
(D) g(atl0 6 atl1)
P1 is always either at label l0 or at label l1 .
(E) g(atl1  gcposy )
Once P1 is at label atl1 , y will never be bigger than 0.
(F) gc(atl0 7 atl1)
P1 cannot be in both label l0 and label l1 at the same time.
We can prove that the proposition A 7B 7C 7 D 7
E 7 F  G is valid (see [BE87]).
10.2. Proving Mutual Exlusion and Freedom
from Starvation
This example will be a very simple minded example of a
mutual exclusion protocol. Each process has its own com-
munication register which can contain only the values 0
and 1. A process can read other processes' registers but it is
the only one that is allowed to write in its own register. We
assume that the registers are atomic, namely, in any execu-
tion, we can assume that the different write and read opera-
tions can be assumed to be interleaved (compare with
[Lam86]). Besides this assumption, we are not assuming
any relation about the relative timing between different
processes. An individual protocol is described in Fig. 3. It
is not too difficult to see that if any number of processes
perform this protocol then the mutual exclusion of the dif-
ferent sections is guaranteed. (If processes A and B are
simultaneously in their critical section then each one
entered its critical section after writing 1 and then reading
all the other communication registers which gave 0. We are
referring to the final writing of 1 before the critical section
is entered. By our assumption about the atomicity of the
registers either the write of A preceded the write of B or vice
versa. Without loss of generality assume that the write
operation of A preceded that of B. Hence when B was read-
ing the communication register of A it must have read 1, so
it would not enter his critical section, hence a contra-
diction).
The property which is not guaranteed for every execution
sequence is the avoidance of starvation or even deadlock.
One can easily schedule the actions of two processes trying
to get into their critical section such that both keep writing
1, reading the other communication register, and getting 1,
FIG. 3. The program executed by the i th process.
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hence restarting the protocol and so ad infinitum. (It is a
general fact that for any protocol such that each process
uses only two values, one can not have mutual exclusion
and freedom from starvation for every execution sequence
(see for instance [AM])). On the other hand, one can show
that for a co-meagre set of execution sequences deadlock or
even starvation is avoided.
Let us describe how a system made of two processes
which perform the above protocol can be described in our
logic: The two processes will be denoted by A and B. We
shall have several propositional variables describing the
state of each of this processes, so we shall subscript them by
A or B, respectively. So for instance CiA for i=0, 1 is true
if the register of A contains i. Similarly for CiB . We shall
have six propositional variables for each process describing
the stage of the protocol it is in (each one has to subscripted
by A or B respectively): atl1 , atl2 , ..., atl6. Since we are not
making any assumption about the timing (besides the
atomicity assumption), each process can stay in the same
state arbitrarily long. The atomicity assumption is
expressed by the fact that no two ``write'' or ``read'' trans-
itions are done simultaneously. The behavior of our system
is described as follows (for an axiom where the proposi-
tional variables are not subscripted we actually mean the
conjunction of the formula where each propositional
variable is indexed by A and one which each propositional
variable is indexed by B):
Init.
atl1  c(atl2 6 atl3 6 } } } 6 atl6)
7 m((C0 Until atl3 7 atl2) 6 atl1)
Sleep.
atl2  c(atl3 6atl46 } } } 6 atl6) 7 m(atl26 atl3)
This formula intuitively expresses that if the process is in a
sleep state (l2) then it is not in any other state, it has 0 in its
register, and in the next moment it can either stay in a sleep
state or move to state l3 .
Write.
atl3  c(atl4 6 atl5 6 atl6)
7 m((atl4 7C1 Until atl1) 6 atl3)
Read.
atl4  (C0o  m(atl5 6 atl4)) 7 (C1o  m(atl5 6 atl4))
7 c(atl5 6atl6).
In this case we have to refer to the possible transition in
terms of the other process, so in the above formula C0o and
C1o o either A or B and it is the other process than the one
for which the formula is stated.
Critical.
atl5  m(atl5 6 atl6) 7catl6
Loop.
atl6  m(atl1 6 atl6)
Atomicity. This formula expresses the fact the registers
are atomic; that is to say, we do not simultaneously perform
read and write transitions on the same register. (The fact
that no two reads are done simultaneously follows from the
previous formulas, so we have to make sure that A does
read the register of B while B is writing it and vice versa.)
A read transition in our protocol is characterized by the
formula atl4; a write transition is identified by atl16 atl3.
(alt4A  c(atl1B 6 atl3B)) 7 (atl4B  c(atl1A 6 atl3A))
The formula we are interested in expresses the fact that if
one of our processes is not in a sleeping condition infinitely
many times then it will be in the critical section infinitely
many times (denote it by NS for ``no starvation''):
ghcatl2  ghatl5
Another formula expresses the mutual exclusion (ME):
c(alt5A 7 atl5B)
The fact that a process behaves according to the protocol
and that the registers can have only one value at a time can
be expressed by the formula (called correctness)
g((atl1 6 atl2 6 ... 6 atl6) 7 c(C07 C1))
The correctness of the protocol for a co-meagre set of
execution sequences (namely, if we start from a situation in
which mutual exclusion is not violated, then in the future it
will not be violated and neither process will be starved) can
be expressed as
{[ME 7 CorrectA 7 CorrectB 7 Atomicity )
 (gME 7 NS)]
The validity of the formula proves the correctness for a co-
meagre set of legal execution sequence. We shall not present
here the formal proof, which can be rather tedious and can
be constructed from the informal argument, but let us just
point out that the completeness proof guarantees that such
a proof exists.
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11. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we formalize the concept of ``general execu-
tion'' of a concurrent program by considering the topology
of the space of all possible execution sequences and looking
at ``co-meagre'' sets in this topology. To support this
approach, we have shown that for most reasonable notions
of fairness used in the literature, the set of all fair executions
turns out to be a co-meagre set in the appropriate topology.
We have presented a variation of the temporal logic of
linear time that can be used for specification and verification
of properties that hold in the generic execution of a parallel
program. The formal system was already suggested by
Lehmann and Shelah [LS82], but we give it different,
topological semantics. Our system is decidable, sound, and
complete for models of arbitrary size, but it has the finite
model property.
In [FHLdR79], and also in some more recent work
[Var85, KP90], it has been suggested to distinguish
between non-determinism which is external to the program
and caused, for example, by scheduling or relative timing of
different processes and non-determinism which is internal to
a particular process. Fairness can be applied to both types
of non-determinism (see for example [AFK88]). Vardi
[Var85] suggests an analysis of distributed probabilistic
messages, based on the notion of concurrent stochastic pro-
cess, which partition the state space of the system into two
types of states: states in which internal non-deterministic
choices are taken, and states in which external non-deter-
ministic choices are take. These two types of states alternate
during the execution of the program. A schedule is a sub-
graph of the execution tree obtained by selecting one branch
out of each set of external non-deterministic choices but
keeping the full sets of internal non-deterministic choices.
Hence it is possible to extract many schedules from the
space of all possible executions of a program. In Vardi's
approach internal non-determinism is expressed by proba-
bilistic choices, and each choice can be analyzed as a Markov
process. A property holds (probabilistically) over a con-
current stochastic process if it holds with probability 1 over
every schedule. This approach considers the worst case for
external non-determinism, and for internal choices it is ready
to ignore a set of executions of measure 0 in each schedule.
The logical system presented in this paper cannot be used
to prove properties of programs which depend on the above
distinction between internal and external nondeterminism.
The system presented by Lehmann and Shelah is also not
capable of handling such variants. However, our language
can be modified to handle such a refined analysis. One
should generalize the operator { to a binary operator
{(,, ) having the following meaning: consider a model
M=(S, u, l, R) as in Definition 3.1. A ,-determined sub-
model of M (notation: M,) is a model (S, , u, l $, R$) , where
the following conditions hold:
1. S,S;
2. For every s # S, , if , is satisfied by the model
(S, s, l, R) , then R$(s, t) O (R(s, t) and there is no v{t
such that R$(s, v));
3. For each s # S, , l $(s)=l(s).
Informally, to get M, we prune the original tree (M) in such
a way that each state satisfying , will have exactly one child.
We then say that {(,, ) holds at a state s in M if for every
,-determined submodel of M starting at s, for a co-meagre
set of paths  holds. Our unary operator { is a special case
of the new binary operator by taking ,=false. Note that
taking ,=true means ``for every branch  holds,'' so the
new language covers also the expressibility of the temporal
logic of branching time.
The two variants of non-determinism mentioned above
can easily be handled in this language by having a proposi-
tional variable p which intuitively means that we are in a
state where internal non-deterministic choices are taken.
The statement that  holds in ``almost all'' executions (no
matter what are the external choices) can be expressed by
{(cp, ). We are currently working on finding a complete
axiom system for this generalized language.
APPENDIX A. A COUNTER EXAMPLE
In this appendix we give an outline of a counter example
to Lemma 24 which appears on p. 194 of [LS82].
The lemma is stated as follows:
Lemma 24. Let b # 1n , _ be an 0(b)-standard generic
path of U, and { and {$ be two equivalent sequences of U; then
(a) b | _U=true  b # _(0)
(b) b | {U=true  b |
{$
U=true.
(Compare the above lemma to Lemma 9.38 in this paper.)
Since we take this lemma out of context, we should men-
tion that U is the model constructed in the completeness
proof and 0 is a function from the set of formulas to N,
which assigns a fixed natural number to every formula, in
a way explained in Sect. 4 of [LS82]. [LS82] define an
m-standard sequence as follows (see third paragraph on
p. 194 of [LS82]):
Let m be a natural number. Let _ be a sequence
of states of U. If there exists a n # N such that _(n)
is terminal, for all i such that 0i<n+m we
have _(i)\_(i+1), and for all i such that n+mi
we have _(i)r_(i+1), we shall say that _ is a
m-standard sequence.
The reader has probably noticed that our definition of an
m-standard sequence is substantially different. The reason is
that as we prove in the sequel, with the above definition of
m-standardness, for every natural number assigned by the
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function 0 to the formula b, we can find a counterexample
to Lemma 24, as stated in [LS82]. We will show that for
every m, we can build a model M and an m-standard generic
path _ (in the sense of [LS82]) such that p Until q  _(0)
but p Until q | _M=true, where p, q # Pvar.
Suppose Pvar=[ p, q] and consider the following model
M: M has three states: s0, s1, s2. At s0, p=true, q=false, at
s1 both p and q are true and at s2 both p and q are false. The
transitions are as follows: from s0 we can move to s1 or to
s2 or stay at s0, from s1 we can move to s0, and from s2 we
can move to s0.
Now we construct a legal sequence _* in this model: We
start from s0 and we require it to have the following
property: If at a certain point k and for some formula a, the
set of paths starting from the state at k and satisfying a, is
of first category, then the tail of _*, avoids this set. (You do
it by induction; At each stage we get a countable list of
nowhere dense sets we are required to avoid. They are made
up of previous sets we did not run away from, as well as new
set, because we have new k$s. Now we pick one of these sets
and make a finite extension of _* so as to avoid this set. We
can make these ``pickings'' in such a way that every set we
are required to avoid will eventually be picked.)
Let Tn be the theory made up of all statements holding at
the n-th point of _*. Clearly, for every n Tn is complete. Note
that in view of the construction of _*, we have that if {a
holds at n then a is in Tn , hence Tn is consistent.
Now say that a point n of _* is m-standard of the first kind
if it is the initial point of a sequence that looks like
s0, s0, s0, ... (m+1 times), s1, s0. It is an m-standard point of
the second kind if it looks like s0, s0, ... (m+1 times), s2, s0.
Note that by the construction of our sequence it has (for
every m) infinitely many m-standard points of both kinds.
(The complement is a set of paths described by a formula
which is satisfied only by a first category set; hence we have
avoided it).
A complete consistent theory is said to be good for a par-
ticular infinite set of points of our sequence if every formula
in it belongs to infinitely many Tn , such that n is in the set.
The following facts are rather easily verified:
v For every infinite set of points there is a good theory
for this set. (Proof. Let T be the set of sentences which are
true at almost all the points of the given infinite set (namely,
except possibly finitely many points). Using the particular
way we have constructed _*, we can easily show that T is
consistent, Hence there is an extension of T to a complete
consistent theory T*. T* is as required because if a sentence
a is in T*, it must be in infinitely many Tn 's from our set,
because otherwise its negation is in T, and a cannot be
in T*).
v A theory good for an infinite set is terminal.
v If T1 and T2 are theories good for two (possibly
different) infinite sets then T1T2 and T2T1.
v If T1 and T2 are good for two (possibly different)
infinite sets A, B such that at every point of A and at every
point of B _* has the same state (and it is the same for A and
B!) then T1 is an alternative to T2. (Proof. Assume {a is in
T1. Pick n in A such that {a is in Tn . Hence the set of paths
starting from s (s is the common state at every point of A
and B) satisfying ca is of first category. Therefore by the
construction of _*, at every point of B also the tail of _*
does not satisfy ca, so a is in Tm for every m in B; hence a
is in T2.)
Note that the same argument shows that T1+k is an alter-
native for T2+k, where T +k is the k-th successor of T.
Now fix m. Let T1 be a theory good for the set of
m-standard points of the first kind and T2 a theory good for
the set of m-standard points of the second kind. Recall that
T1 and T2 are terminals. We now construct a sequence { in
the transition system constructed in [LS82] which will be a
counterexample to their Lemma 24.
The sequence { will be as follows: trace(T2), trace(T2+1),
trace(T2+2), trace(T2+m), trace(T1+(m+1)) and from there
on any continuation that will make the sequence generic
(e.g., since r is reflexive and \ is a function we can continue
with trace(T1+(m+2)), trace(T1+(m+3))...). Note that { is
m-standard in the sense of [LS82]. { satisfies p Until q
because we moved at the (m+1)-th point to
trace(T1+(m+1)), but trace(T2), its first state does not con-
tain p Until q because T2 is good for the points of the
second kind.
Since m was arbitrary it means that no fixed length of
``standardness'' is sufficient to guarantee the truth of
Lemma 24.
The same modified definition that we used for standard
paths (Definition 9.28) will correct the error of [LS82] for
the probabilistic (measure theoretic) case.
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